My former employer, the United Nations Development Programme, is taking much abuse this week from the conservative establishment. Much of it is rightly deserved. The Economist published a piece excoriating UNDP for lauding the new “self-sufficiency” policy of the military government Thailand, developed by the King. This theory is broadly:
for sustainability, moderation and broad-based development; and against excessive risk-taking, inequality and other evils
I think most folks can get behind these platitudes, especially in SE Asia, where Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea have demonstrated that controls on globalization don’t necessarily have to turn back development. The Economist goes on, however, to remonstrate UNDP for both failing to acknowledge the success of Thaksin’s policies (which actually did a great deal to alleviate the lot of the poorest) and supporting “new-age waffle” which can be used to justify all sorts of backwards policies, from nationalization of industries to stric government regulations.
Perhaps it makes sense for the new government to obscure its predecessor’s achievements while stealing its best clothes. The question is why the UNDP thinks it should provide cover for this whitewash by puffing the sufficiency economy as a miracle-cure for the developing world’s woes. The answer is that the UNDP is a sucker for this sort of new-age waffle, especially if it has royal patronage. It has also lauded the not entirely dissimilar “Gross National Happiness” theory of Bhutan’s King Jigme Singye Wangchuk.
In publishing such an unbalanced report on a theory that is untried on a national level, the UNDP has abandoned all sense of objectivity. It is also lending legitimacy to a regime that took power by force. Hakan Bjorkman, the UNDP’s deputy chief in Thailand, says it wanted to provoke a debate. But no such debate is possible in Thailand, because sufficiency theory is the king’s philosophy and anything remotely critical of it could be seen as lèse-majesté, punishable with jail.
A second piece, titled “United Nations Dictators Program,” in the Wall Street Journal from Melanie Kirkpatrick describes the lack of delivery and possible corruption in UNDP’s North Korean program. She argues that UNDP’s program to delivering roughly $6 mm per annum across 30 projects in North Korea suffers from poor oversight and likely serves mainly as a source of hard currency for the regime. Though falling short of accusing UNDP ofcorruption, Kirkpatrick argues that UNDP is “willfully blind” to the North Korean government’s willingness to break UN rules to get access to hard currency.
Unlike Oil for Food, there’s no evidence to date that corrupt UNDP officials are in on the game–though given the U.N.’s record of late, it would be unwise to rule that out before a full investigation. There is, however, plenty of evidence of willful blindness on the part of the UNDP, which let myriad rules be broken and allowed itself to become a large source of hard currency for the regime. Nor did it bring these irregularities to the attention of its governing body, the 36-member executive board.
Examples include staffing and procurement relationships:
In addition to appointing the UNDP’s staff, the North Korean government requires that UNDP pay their salaries to the government, which presumably takes its cut…..In yet another violation of the rules, UNDP gives local staff a cash “meal stipend” of $120 a month, which is another hard currency contribution.
The UNDP also accedes to Pyongyang’s demands that it pay cash to local government vendors. That’s another violation of U.N. rules, as is placing North Korean staffers in jobs that give them control of financial records, personnel actions, and equipment and supplies. To cite just one example of abuse, the 1999 internal audit found that the UNDP checkbook was not kept in a secure location and no check register was maintained reflecting checks written.
Kirkpatrick goes on to highlight the negative impact of one of the dirtiest little secrets of UNDP project implementation–so-called “nationally executed,” or “NEX” projects– in which money is transferred directly to government officials, who then allocate the money back to UNDP and implementing non-profit organizations.
There is little if any oversight of the UNDP’s projects in North Korea, which, according to a U.N. document, numbered 30 last year. UNDP regulations require one official, on-site visit a year but since Pyongyang prohibits foreigners from visiting some of the project sites, that’s another rule that’s out the window. Audits of individual projects are spotty at best and in the case of “nationally executed” or “NEX” projects–that is, those run by the North Korean government with funds provided by the UNDP–they are often done by the government itself, giving new meaning to the adage about the fox running the henhouse.
This is unfortunately a weakness in many UNDP offices around the world, and speaks to two broader challenges that UNDP faces and will continue to face.
First, UNDP is tasked as the main branch of the United Nations for interacting with local governments in developing countries. As such, one of its main responsibilities is to develop strong relationships with local government officials, many of whom serve in UN posts during their careers. These relationships pay off not only when development projects need to be implemented, but also when peace negotiations need to be held by the UN Secretary General’s office or famine needs to be avoided by the World Food Program or a natural disaster needs to be addressed by the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. So UNDP wears two hats, as both an implementing agency funding and leading development projects on the ground and as a coordinating agency on behalf of the rest of the UN. As a result, UNDP will continue to pander to local governments more than, say, the folks at USAID or independent non-profits, who report only to the philanthropists or national governments who fund them.
The second challenge faced by UNDP and the UN system more broadly–and it’s one that we as Americans find especially hard to swallow–is the challenge of communicating to the world the belief that engagement and process matter. The UN was founded on this belief that engagement and discussion could help people resolve conflict. (So, by the way, was the U.S. government.) However, belief in process, in addition to forcing UN diplomats to attend an ungodly number of conferences and cocktail parties, often leads to disturbing results such as endorsing weakened economic policies or funding a dictator. They also create a cover for more nefarious activities, such as foreign officials attending conferences solely to charge appearance fees or per diems.
Lastly, these articles highlight perhaps the saddest fact about the state of UNDP certainly, if not the broader UN, and that is the lack of oversight of activities at any level, from the remote, on-the-ground microfinance project all the way up to HQ-level appropriations meeting. This lack of oversight leaves a vacuum in which it is no surprise that sinister activities take place.
Happily, the UN’s new Sec Gen has immediately a forcefully replied to Kirkpatrick’s article, requesting
an urgent, system wide and external inquiry into all activities done around the globe by the U.N. funds and programs.
For regular UN watchers, this is actually big news, as rarely does anything happen with the immediacy of this announcement, nor does the UN often open its doors to independent oversight. See the follow up piece in WSJ here.
(Thanks, Dad and Sanjay, for relevant articles)