An interesting, if not entirely accurate, article in the NYT magazine this weekend highlights the extent to which poor countries are “subsidizing” rich countries. Tina Rosenberg argues that developing countries subsidize rich countries through the following methods:
- By holding excess foreign-denominated assets, especially U.S. Treasuries, in their reserves
- By agreeing to WTO-enforced standards regarding intellectual property rights enforcement
Consider the World Trade Organization’s requirements that all member countries respect patents and copyrights — patents on medicines and industrial and other products; copyrights on, say, music and movies. As poorer countries enter the W.T.O., they must agree to pay royalties on such goods — and a result is a net obligation of more than $40 billion annually that poorer countries owe to American and European corporations.
There are good reasons for countries to respect intellectual property, but doing so is also an overwhelming burden on the poorest people in poorer countries. After all, the single largest beneficiary of the intellectual-property system is the pharmaceutical industry. But consumers in poorer nations do not get much in return, as they do not form a lucrative enough market to inspire research on cures for many of their illnesses. Moreover, the intellectual-property rules make it difficult for poorer countries to manufacture less-expensive generic drugs that poor people rely on. The largest cost to poor countries is not money but health, as many people simply will not be able to find or afford brand-name medicine.
- By offering tax incentives for foreign investors from the developed world
The hypercompetition for global investment has produced another important reverse subsidy: the tax holidays poor countries offer foreign investors. A company that announces it wants to make cars, televisions or pharmaceuticals in, say, east Asia, will then send its representatives to negotiate with government officials in China, Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere, holding an auction for the best deal. The savviest corporations get not only 10-year tax holidays but also discounts on land, cheap government loans, below-market rates for electricity and water and government help in paying their workers.
Rich countries know better — the European Union, for example, regulates the incentives members can offer to attract investment. That car plant will most likely be built in one of the competing countries anyway — the incentives serve only to reduce the host country’s benefits. Since deals between corporations and governments are usually secret, it is hard to know how much investment incentives cost poorer countries — certainly tens of billions of dollars. Whatever the cost, it is growing, as country after country has passed laws enabling the offer of such incentives.
- By allowing their highly trained professionals to emigrate and practice in developed countries
Human nature, not smart lobbying, is responsible for another poor-to-rich subsidy: the brain drain. The migration of highly educated people from poor nations is increasing. A small brain drain can benefit the South, as emigrants send money home and may return with new skills and capital. But in places where educated people are few and emigrants don’t go home again, the brain drain devastates. In many African countries, more than 40 percent of college-educated people emigrate to rich countries. Malawian nurses have moved to Britain and other English-speaking nations en masse, and now two-thirds of nursing posts in Malawi’s public health system are vacant. Zambia has lost three-quarters of its new physicians in recent years. Even in South Africa, 21 percent of graduating doctors migrate.
The financial consequences for the poorer nations can be severe. A doctor who moves from Johannesburg to North Dakota costs the South African government as much as $100,000, the price of training him there. As with patent enforcement, a larger cost may be in health. A lack of trained people — a gap that widens daily — is now the main barrier to fighting AIDS, malaria and other diseases in Africa.
- By disproportionately bearing the costs of climate change
Most costly to poor countries, they have been drafted into paying for rich nations’ energy use. On a per capita basis, Americans emit more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere — and thus create more global warming — than anyone else. What we pay to drive a car or keep an industrial plant running is not the true cost of oil or coal. The real price would include the cost of the environmental damage that comes from burning these fuels. But even as we do not pay that price, other countries do. American energy use is being subsidized by tropical coastal nations, who appear to be global warming’s first victims. Some scientists argue that Bangladesh already has more powerful monsoon downpours and Honduras fiercer cyclones because of global warming — likely indicators of worse things ahead. The islands of the Maldives may someday be completely underwater. The costs these nations will pay do not appear on the global balance sheets. But they are the ultimate subsidy.
These arguments frankly anger me. All of her observations are true. But by labeling these costs “subsidies,” Rosenberg implies that they are implemented as part of active government policy and that they are avoidable. I find neither of these arguments to be true. I could piece through each point made by the author, but I will leave it to the reader to think through, for each of these points, what are the costs and benefits of an alternative policy? What costs would be associated with the alternative (e.g., what if we stopped enforcing intellectual property rights?) Unfortunately, capitalism has its costs–but so do its alternatives, as evidenced by the downward spiralling North Korean regime.
A better title for this article might be, “Why it Stinks to be a Poor Country.” Yes, it does. Point well argued.
A simple case in point is the author’s first and one of her more powerful examples, the excessive holdings of foreign-denominated assets by developing country governments. not surprisingly, a recent body of economic research has arisen to suggest that this is not necessarily such a bad thing. The Economist recently highlighted a study suggesting that the weak local financial markets of many developing countries encourage both private and public investors to hold overseas assets.
Ricardo Caballero and Emmanuel Farhi of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as well as Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas of the University of California, Berkeley… point out that emerging economies have been frantically accumulating real assets, such as assembly lines and office towers, but their generation of financial assets has not kept pace. Thanks to weak property rights, fear of expropriation and poor bankruptcy procedures, many newly rich countries are unable to create enough trustworthy claims on their future incomes. Lacking vehicles for saving at home, the thrifty buy assets abroad instead. In China, Mr Caballero argues, this is done indirectly through the state, which buys foreign securities, such as Treasuries, then issues bonds of its own, which are held by Chinese banks, companies and households.
Because emerging economies’ supply of financial instruments is so unreliable, people may hoard more of them as a precautionary measure. Firms and households fear they will not be able to borrow to tide themselves over bad times, therefore they choose to save for a rainy day instead. Because they cannot transfer purchasing power from the future to the present, they must store it from the past.
This is only part of a broader argument that investors are less worried about the state of global imbalances. While it’s not clear whether these theories are simply ad hoc explanations of what is really a disaster waiting to happen or really improved explanations of how the world works, at the very least they suggest that there is a reasonable rationale for developing countries to hold significant foreign reserves. While this may result in “lost income,” clearly the cost of this lost income is less than the perceived benefit.
Thanks, Brian, for the NYT reference.